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7 NOVEMBER 1967

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (U)



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DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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VIETNAM AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

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
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
NORTH VIETNAM

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SOUTH VIETNAM

THAILAND
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Military Situation in Laos

Enemy activity in the Nam Bac area decreased during the week ending 3 November. Sporadic and ineffective mortar fire and two minor attacks were primarily aimed at keeping pressure on the area, while the Communists regrouped and resupplied their units.

In the Luang Prabang area, an alert airfield defense force broke up an enemy effort to attack the field.

Royal Lao Forces (FAR) in southern Laos are still concerned over a reported enemy buildup east and south of Thakhek.

Military Region 1

Enemy activity was light in the Nam Bac area where offensive action was confined to sporadic mortar fire and several minor clashes.

A FAR battalion, after overcoming light enemy resistance on 31 October, has had difficulty traversing rugged terrain and has been unable to secure the high ground south of Phou Kou. Some fresh enemy positions have been noted in the area, and a renewed effort to secure it has been scheduled. On 1 November, the FAR launched a successful night attack against a position to the east of Nam Bac. FAR troops that same day dispersed an enemy unit attempting to mine Route 4 northwest of Nam Bac and recovered a Chinese mine. Confirmed enemy killed in the Nam Bac area now stands at 79 since 24 October; FAR forces have lost 26 killed and 59 wounded.

The enemy will probably continue his regrouping and resupply efforts in preparation for future attacks in the Nam Bac area. FAR leaders consider the dominant hill mass to the northwest of Nam Bac as a likely target. Pressure against Phou Kou and other areas is expected to continue at least

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at a level to keep government troops in their present positions. Although the Communists have pushed FAR forces back into perimeters around Nam Bac, the area does not appear in danger of being overrun at the present time. The US Mission considers that the Nam Bac Valley can be held provided FAR forces continue to improve their patrol capabilities, effectiveness of artillery fire, and centralization of control before the upcoming dry season.

FAR troops stopped an estimated company-size enemy force that was apparently trying to reach Luang Prabang Airfield. Two of the enemy were reportedly killed and one FAR soldier was wounded. This was the second recent attempt to reach the airfield in an apparent effort to duplicate the disastrous attacks on 2 February and 15 July.

Royal Lao paramilitary troops have begun a planned withdrawal from the Muong Sing area, where they seized and held the airstrip for several days without drawing the enemy into killing zones as they had hoped to do.

Military Region 2

Royal Lao defenses are stronger in the Muong Ngan valley as a result of government troops regaining and improving their positions lost to the enemy on 7 October. Elsewhere in the region, enemy activity remained at a low level.

Military Region 3

FAR tactical headquarters in southern Laos is still concerned over possible enemy intentions with respect to the Thakhek area and bridges on Route 13. There continue to be indications of enemy activity in the Mahaxay area to the east and south of Thakhek and southeast of the Se Bang Fai bridge as well as reports that two enemy battalions have moved from the east toward the west. Enemy contacts in these areas indicate the probability of these moves, but not the presence of additional units.

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US Mission sources say that there are some signs of tighter enemy control in the area east of Thakhek as evidenced by the fact that no refugees are exiting as they usually do; moreover, enemy agents are active in at least four local villages, probably in an increased effort to gather information.

Military Region 4

On 31 October, FAR troops launched a long-delayed sweep against an estimated enemy battalion. The operation is designed to force the enemy to the Thai border where troops of the Royal Thai Army are employed in blocking positions. On the first day of the operation, a Pathet Lao and a North Vietnamese were captured and an enemy military camp was discovered 20 kilometers southwest of Pakse.

On the same day, the enemy launched a mortar and ground attack that came to within 500 meters of a paramilitary position northwest of Saravane. This location is used as a launch base for ambush and harassment activity against the enemy.

Military Region 5

A two-hour engagement on 29 October between an estimated enemy platoon and a government patrol 35 kilometers northwest of Vientiane resulted in eight of the enemy killed and three wounded. Captured weapons and equipment included three rifles, two carbines, two Soviet pistols, several hand grenades, a plastic mine, one radio, spare radio tubes with Chinese markings, and a small quantity of medical supplies.

During the night of 2 November, an enemy element tried to destroy a bridge approximately 30 kilometers northeast of Vientiane. FAR troops repulsed the attempt, killed one of the enemy, and wounded several others. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~

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**VIETNAM
AND
RELATED DEVELOPMENTS**

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R South Vietnam Situation Report

Enemy-initiated activity in South Vietnam subsided on 5 and 6 November after the intense series of attacks in the Loc Ninh area of Binh Long Province. In Phuoc Long, an ARVN infantry element made contact with an estimated 100 enemy near Song Be shortly before noon on the 5th. Artillery and air support were called in, and the enemy broke contact about one hour later. ARVN soldiers in the area again made contact with the enemy during the late afternoon and together with reinforcements dispatched to the scene engaged a battalion-size force. Sporadic contact continued during the night with elements believed to be subordinate to the 275th VC Regiment. Viet Cong casualties were 15 killed; friendly losses were 96 killed, 36 wounded, and 25 missing.

Elsewhere in South Vietnam on the 5th, enemy gunners in the DMZ area attacked ARVN Base A-1 near Gio Linh in 1st Corps with 35 rounds of 105-mm howitzer fire and fired 40 rounds from 82-mm mortars on a Royal Thai Army battalion deployed in Bien Hoa Province in 3d Corps. In 4th Corps, two enemy battalions lost 28 killed during an attack on Cai Lai District Town in Dinh Tuong Province; friendly losses during this previously reported battle were 15 ARVN soldiers and 15 civilians killed, and 37 ARVN and 65 civilians wounded.

On 6 November, significant enemy activity took place in 1st and 2d Corps. In Quang Nam Province, the market area in Hoi An was hit by one mortar round shortly after midnight, and at about the same time a hamlet and military base six miles from Hoi An were struck by 80 mortar rounds. One hour later, a Route 1 bridge in the vicinity was destroyed. Cumulative Vietnamese military losses from the attacks were 12 killed, 18 wounded, and 13 missing. About five miles south-southeast of An Hoa, a US Marine company received heavy small arms, grenade, and mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force located

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in a fortified village with bunkers, trenches, spider holes, and protective wire. Heavy contact continued until the early morning hours of the 7th, with artillery and air strikes hitting the enemy as they fell back from one defensive line to another. Initial results indicate six US killed and 45 wounded; enemy losses are unknown. In Quang Tin, 26 enemy were killed during an engagement with two Regional Forces (RF) companies near Tam Ky; RF casualties were one killed and one wounded. An ARVN unit discovered six separate caves, seven miles north-northeast of Dong Ha in Quang Tri Province, each containing 20 rounds of 140-mm rockets; 20 rounds of 60-mm mortar ammunition were also found. 140-mm rockets were first used in South Vietnam against Da Nang Airbase on 27 Feb 67. An enemy force in Binh Dinh Province kidnaped 238 Montagnards from five villages five miles west of An Khe. US Army infantry elements went to the area, located 60 women and children during an afternoon patrol southwest of An Khe and returned the Montagnards to their villages for interrogation; one hamlet chief was killed during the kidnapping. The magnitude of the kidnapping indicates that some enemy elements may be relying on them to replace personnel losses. In Khanh Hoa Province, an estimated two enemy companies on a possible rice resupply mission were engaged by South Korean elements; 64 enemy were killed. Korean casualties were 20 killed and 27 wounded. During Operation SHENANDOAH II in 3d Corps a US infantry position about six miles northeast of Loc Ninh received 20 rounds of 60-mm mortar fire wounding 18; a countermortar plan was executed with unknown results.

A rallier from the 66th NVA Regiment has provided additional information on possible enemy attacks in the Dak To area in Kontum Province. He said that the 40th Artillery Regiment was subordinate to the NVA B-3 Front and that one of its subordinates was the Viet Cong 200th Main Force Artillery Battalion, reportedly armed with 82-mm mortars and 122-mm rockets. Another source, captured on 27 October prior to the rocket attack

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on the ARVN 3d Corps Headquarters near Pleiku City, stated that he was from the 200th Artillery Battalion; he said that his unit was equipped with "82-mm mortars and 122-mm rockets."

COMUSMACV reports that previous intelligence on the 200th indicated that the battalion was armed with 82-mm and 120-mm mortars. It is possible that another unit -- probably an NVA artillery battalion that infiltrated last spring -- has joined the 200th Battalion to form two artillery units. One of these was equipped with 82-mm mortars and another with 120-mm mortars and 122-mm rockets. Although the "40th Artillery Regiment" is not listed in the enemy order of battle, a control element for the two possible artillery battalions may have been formed to pass on tactical orders from the B-3 Front.

The rallier from the NVA 66th Regiment said that 122-mm rockets, capable of delivering tear gas, would be used against Dak To during an attack scheduled for early November. Maneuver elements ordered to assault the Special Forces Camp were issued gas masks, and the rallier indicated that his unit had been supplied heavy weapons by the 32d NVA Regiment. This suggests that the 32d may be used in an assault role in any attack on Dak To, while the 66th would furnish fire support and reinforcements.

In a confusing broadcast on 6 November, the Viet Cong indicated the three US Army prisoners of war they had promised to release were freed on 31 October. However, during another portion of the lengthy Liberation Radio broadcast they indicated the prisoners were being held until "Viet Cong terms were met."

Although a US Mission observer in a statement to the press said prisoners could have been turned over to "some local officials," there is no firm evidence available to indicate that the men have been released. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~



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NR [North Vietnamese MIGs Recover in China After Combat Patrol

North Vietnamese MIGs have been noted for the first time recovering at a Chinese base following a combat mission flown from airfields in North Vietnam.

Sec. 3.3(b) (1) two MIG-21s from Gia Lam Airfield flew a probable combat reaction mission against US aircraft during the early morning hours of 6 November and recovered at Ningming Airfield in China. About five hours later, two MIG-21s -- probably the same ones -- returned to Gia Lam. On the afternoon of the 6th, two MIG-21s were again noted reacting from Gia Lam and recovering at Ningming. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

During the reaction and subsequent recovery in China on the morning of the 6th, several US pilots reported sighting MIG-17s and MIG-21s, and at least two engagements with MIG-17s occurred with no losses on either side. Two MIG-21s attempted to engage the strike force but were apparently chased from the area by the MIG CAP. These may have been the same aircraft that recovered in China.

The North Vietnamese may have feared a strike on Gia Lam and sought the safehaven of China for recovery. On the other hand, this may be the beginning of the regular use of Chinese bases for landings following MIG reactions. Although only Ningming has been utilized so far, other airfields in southern China may be made available.


The North Vietnamese will probably maintain a limited number of MIG-17s and MIG-21s in-country through assembly of new aircraft or by fly-ins from China. Primary reactions will probably continue from Gia Lam Airfield, with the other North Vietnamese airfields being used, when operational, for recovery or staging. (SECRET) Sec. 3.3(b)
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NR Prefabricated Barge Sections Probably En Route to Hanoi


(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 prefabricated steel barge sections moving inland by waterborne transport from Haiphong on the Canal des Rapides. For about the past 18 months, North Vietnam has been negotiating with East European countries and North Korea for additions to its barge fleet, and orders have been placed with these sources for 192 barges to be assembled in the country.

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97 have been received; they range in capacity from 60 to 400 dead weight tons (DWT) and the total order could increase the country's lift capability by as much as a 38,000 DWT -- a figure consistent with Hanoi's efforts to upgrade its waterborne transport operations. Most of North Vietnam's barges are needed on the extensive Red River Delta waterway system. The number imported is far below the some 1,500 waterborne craft of all types estimated destroyed or damaged per month since 1966. Barges in the Haiphong-Hanoi area are, however, rarely hit as they enjoy lower priorities as air strike targets.

Imported barge sections are placed in open storage at Haiphong and then transported to boat-building yards in and near Haiphong. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 that the 1967 import rate has been deliberate, paced at about 30 barges per quarter. The number of barge sections observed in open storage at Haiphong since June has ranged from 200 to almost 600. The number of sections per barge varies, but it is believed that the 400-ton barge consists of 10 sections. Ship-building facilities are considered adequate to accommodate this import rate.

The observation of barge sections being transported via the Canal des Rapides may indicate that it has been necessary to shift barge assembly operations to facilities at Hanoi because of recent air strikes on those in Haiphong. This would alleviate open-storage

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congestion at Haiphong and speed up the over-all assembly process and may further imply the immediate requirement for these craft to augment transport operations, ~~resulting from constrained interdiction of land LOCs.~~ (SECRET Sec. 3.3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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NR Summary of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam on 6 November

A total of 141 US aircraft conducted strikes against North Vietnamese targets on 6 November.

There were two aircraft lost due to enemy action on 6 November. A USAF F-105D was downed from unknown cause 44 nautical miles north of Haiphong. A good chute was observed, and SAR was initiated. A USN A-4E was hit by ground fire 62 nautical miles south-southeast of Hanoi. The pilot ejected over water 55 nautical miles east of Thanh Hoa and was recovered.

Of the sorties flown, 36 were against the following significant targets:

| <u>Sorties</u> | <u>Target</u> | <u>BDA (Pilot Reports)</u> |
|----------------|------------------------------------|--|
| 8 | SAM Sites 43, 89, 159, 212 and 245 | In sites 43 and 159, signal went down; results not observed in other sites. |
| 10 | Kep Railroad Yard | Numerous rail interdictions. |
| 18 | Kep Airfield | All ordnance on target; results were not observed due to numerous MIG engagements. |

Armed Reconnaissance Strike Results

| | <u>Destroyed</u> | <u>Damaged/ Cratered/Cut</u> | <u>Struck (No Report)</u> |
|----------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Bridges | | | 3 |
| Ferries | | | 5 |
| Road segments | | 10 | |
| Trucks | 4 | | 39 |
| Truck parks | | 1 | 8 |
| WBL craft | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| AAA sites | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Buildings/structures | 26 | 5 | |
| Bunkers | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Gun sites | 21 | 6 | 16 |
| Storage areas | | 6 | 20 |
| Bivouac area | | | 1 |

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
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
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